Posted on August 15, 2008 - by Venik

Georgia’s Attack on South Ossetia: Washington’s Role

Elusive NATO Membership

At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 Georgia was denied Membership Action Plan. Aside from Russia’s vehement opposition, the key issues outlined in the NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan, accepted by Georgia in October 2004, remain unresolved. These issues are: Georgia’s antiquated military equipment, insufficient training and deployability of its forces, and, most importantly, unresolved ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Georgia responded to these challenges by requesting US help with training and rearming its forces. The emphasis was made on reducing the size but increasing the quantity and mobility of Georgian army battalions. The 2007 Georgian Strategic Defense Review (SDR) outlined an overall reduction of the country’s armed forces from about 28,000 personnel (excluding civilian contractors and reservists) in 2006 to just 18,755 in 2015. Despite this reduction, since 2004 Georgia has been actively acquiring modern weapons. The SDR assumption was that ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be settled by 2012 and Georgia will be ready to join NATO.

April 3, 2008: From lef to right: US President George Bush, Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia; NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor of Germany

There was a little problem with this plan, however. President Saakashvili’s second term in office is to end in 2012 and there was no guarantee that he would still be in office by the time Georgia was ready to join NATO. With military aid from the US, addressing the issues of training, restructuring and rearming Georgian armed forces was only a matter of sticking to the timetable worked out by American advisors. The simmering ethnic conflicts in the two breakaway republics were the big unknown. It seemed highly unlikely that either Abkhazia or South Ossetia would come under Tbilisi’s control voluntarily. One option would have been to grant the two provinces wide-ranging autonomy. However, such an action would not have been accepted by Saakashvili’s ultra-nationalist supporters in the parliament.

Preparing for War

As part of its rigorous rearmament program, Georgia purchased 30 towed (122-mm D-30) and 12 self-propelled (152-mm “Dana”) howitzers from the Czech Republic in 2006; 6 Mi-24B/P and 2 Mi-8MT assault helicopters from Ukraine in 2005; 31 T-72 main battle tanks from Ukraine and the Czech Republic in 2005; 25 120-mm mortars from the Czech Republic and Bosnia also in 2005; 20 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers from Ukraine in 2005; 12 self-propelled 152-mm 2S3M howitzers from Ukraine in 2004; one Mi-35 assault helicopter from Uzbekistan in 2004; 40 BMP-2 APCs from Ukraine in 2004; 14 120-mm mortars from Bulgaria in 2004; 6 122 mm RM-70 MLRS systems from the Czech Republic in 2003; and other heavy weapons, including fast attack craft, more mortars, howitzers and helicopters. (Source: Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, August 2008; see the complete list of Georgia’s weapons acquisitions since 2000 at the end of this article).

Georgian T-72 tanks during a training exercise 30 km outside Tbilisi in Vaziani on February 14, 2008 (Source: AFP)

Georgia’s defense budget has grown from USD 20 million in 2001 to USD 734 million in 2007 and over USD 900 million in 2008. Accounting for inflation, this is roughly a 40-fold increase in military spending in just six years. So when Irakli Alasania, Georgia’s UN Ambassador, tells the UN Security Council that his country is “a small and peace-loving nation”, the logical question should be: what does a peace-loving nation need with so many new howitzers, mortars, armored personnel carriers, tanks, missile boats, and helicopter gunships? According to the World Bank statistics, the GDP of Georgia has grown from USD 3.2 billion in 2001 to USD 6.39 billion in 2005. The CIA World Factbook puts Georgia’s GDP for 2007 at USD 10.29 billion – an optimistic estimate so far not confirmed by the World Bank. Even so, between 2001 and 2007 Georgian military budget grew 40 times, while the country’s GDP increased about three-fold. Where does Saakashvili get the cash to rearm his army?

Czech-made 152-mm “Dana” self-propelled howitzers of the Georgian army used in the bombardment of Tskhinvali.

Even if Georgia spent its entire ten-billion-dollar GDP on defense, its army still would not have been a match for the Russian military. Was Saakashvili throwing money to the wind, wasting precious resources of his impoverished nation on a hopeless stand-off with Russia? Not at all. If Georgia was getting ready to fight a war with Russia, its primary spending category would have been air defenses. However, take a closer look at the list of Georgia’s weapons acquisitions over the past eight year: there are no signs of any major air defense purchases. Instead, we see lots of mortars, howitzers, tanks, helicopters, and even two landing ships. Georgia was preparing for a war against separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Six Czech-made MR-70 Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems like this one were used by the Georgian army to bombard Tskhinvali, causing more than 2,000 civilian casualties.

So what does Georgia have in terms of air defenses? According to the August 2008 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Georgian air defenses consist of the following: “30 SA-7 Strela-2/2M (Igla) Manportable Surface-to-Air Missile, 5 ZSU-23-4 Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Systems, 12 ZU-23-2 Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 4 100 mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 4 57 mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery.” In other words, Georgia was hardly a threat to the Russian Air Force. Still, Georgia was able to down two Russian aircraft: an Su-25 ground attack jet and the Tu-22M3R reconnaissance plane (a version of the Tu-22M3 supersonic bomber), piloted by Col. Igor Zinov, a 50 year-old Tu-22M3 instructor pilot stationed at the Flight Test Center at Akhtubinsk. The Russians admitted the loss of the two aircraft and said that the Tu-22M3R was shot down by the Georgians using an S-200 (NATO designation: SA-5 Gammon) long-range SAM secretly purchased from Ukraine in late 2007.

The Tu-22M3R is the reconnaissance version of the Tu-22MR supersonic bomber like the one shown in the photos.

The “Georgia Strikes Back With Air Defenses” article in the August 11 issue of Aviation Week cited unnamed US analysts saying that “…the Georgians are probably operating the SA-11 Buk-M1 (low-to-high altitude) and the (low-to-medium altitude) Tor-1M mobile air defense missile systems.” However, neither Buk-M1 not Tor-1M are known to be in Georgia’s inventory and it seems that the Aviation Week editors need to check their sources more rigorously. Regardless of the situation with the downed Russian Backfire, it is clear that Georgia did not expect to fight the Russians in any considerable numbers.

What Were They Thinking?

According to the Georgian attack maps, obtained on August 11 by a forward unit of the Russian 4th VDV regiment from a captured high-ranking Georgian staff officer, Tbilisi’s plan called for a blitzkrieg invasion of South Ossetia in the early morning of August 8, followed by a three-pronged invasion of Abkhazia on August 11, which was to involve the Georgian army’s naval component. This explains Georgia’s acquisitions of landing craft, naval helicopters, and high-speed missile boats. Preparations for the war against the breakaway regions, it would seem, have been carried out for years, starting during the administration of Saakashvili’s predecessor – the USSR’s former Foreign Minister and independent Georgia’s second President Eduard Shevarnadze.

It is interesting to note, that, according to the captured plan, a major portion of the Georgian forces involved in South Ossetia was to be redeployed for the August 11 invasion of Abkhazia (at least a day’s drive from South Ossetia for heavy vehicles, plus another day would have been needed for combat deployment). Evidently, Georgia’s military planners did not anticipate any substantial problems in South Ossetia and fully expected the operation there to be concluded by the end of Saturday, August 9 at the latest.

It is evident that Saakashvili’s generals did not expect an overwhelming military response from Russia. The Georgians timed their assault on Tskhinvali – South Ossetia’s capital – to coincide with the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. With Putin in Beijing mingling with Western heads of states, perhaps the expectation on the part of Tbilisi was of a more cautious Russian response, at least until the end of Putin’s visit to China. However, it would have been extremely naïve for Saakashvili and his to pin all of their hopes on Putin’s absence from Moscow and the ability of Bush to contain Putin’s reaction. Georgia had to have something more substantial in terms of guarantees of Russia’s non-involvement.

Washington’s Role

On August 10 Russian news agency RIA Novosti quoted South Ossetian official representative in Moscow Dmitry Medoev saying that there were several Negroes among the Georgian troops killed during the fighting in Tskhinvali, raising speculation in the Russian press that American military or private (Blackwater is known to operate in Georgia) instructors might have been directly involved in combat.

Over the past few years, hundreds of US military instructors were sent to Georgia to train Saakashvili’s army. Several senior Pentagon officers were permanently stationed in Tbilisi to coordinate these training activities. According to the captured map of Georgia’s planned invasion of Abkhazia, up to two-thirds of the country’s entire military force were to be involved in the operation. It is inconceivable that the US military personnel in Georgia was completely unaware of preparations for such a massive operation.

The Americans had to have known that Georgian artillery was preparing to slaughter hundreds of civilians in Tskhinvali. They had to have known about the large-scale movements of Georgian troops and heavy weapons. Even if American troops stationed in Georgia did not directly participate in the actual combat, there is no doubt in my mind that they knew the details of the planned massive operation against the separatists and, most likely, were involved in the planning stage of this war.

Did the Russians Know?

No matter how you look at it, this war was a huge gamble on Saakashvili’s part. The headquarters of the Russian North-Caucasus Military District and well over a hundred thousand of Russia’s most combat-ready units are located in Vladikavkaz – just a 20-mile drive along the Military-Georgian Road from the Georgian border. Even more Russian forces are stationed in nearby Ingushetia and Chechnya. Several large Russian Air Force bases with dozens of combat-ready aircraft are located within fifteen minutes of flight from Georgia. For Saakashvili – and, by extension, for his masters in Washington – Russian military involvement made a difference between a major geopolitical victory and a humiliating defeat. Whatever the Georgians and the Americans were planning together, they had to be sure that the Russian military was not going to interfere. The most interesting question of this war is what made them think that.

An Mi-24 helicopter gunship of the Russian peacekeeping force in Abkhazia in June 2008. (Source: AP)

Obviously, one way to look at this situation is to acknowledge the obvious – the US military personnel in Georgia knew about the planned actions against South Ossetia and Abkhazia – and to suppose that Saakashvili jumped the gun before all the preparations were completed. While it is possible that Saakashvili took an unauthorized initiative, it is extremely unlikely. Rice’s recent trip to Tbilisi and the apparent ease with which she convinced Saakashvili to sign the peace deal that heavily favors Moscow is a good illustration of how well Washington controls the president of Georgia. Therefore, Saakashvili’s “Olympic” jump into South Ossetia had to be, if not ordered, then at least strongly encouraged by the White House. We have to conclude that the US had good reasons to believe that the Russians will not get involved; or, at the very least, that they will not have enough time to respond.

This is another good point: timing might have been the key to this operation by Georgia. The situation along the border between Georgia and South Ossetia was never calm. However, during the few weeks leading to Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali there has been an increasing number of Georgian mortar attacks against South Ossetia’s territory. Some attacks were quite intense, but none were  followed up by ground operations. Any military cadet will tell you that sporadic and seemingly random shelling of your positions by the enemy is a sign of an upcoming attack. The enemy mortars your positions near the front line to identify their locations and to gauge your response tactics and your timing.

The NY Times claims that this is “a Russian soldier in Igoeti”. In fact, this is a Georgian soldier and the village of Igoeti is 20 kilometers from Tbilisi and is under Georgian control.

The Russians, obviously, knew about the attacks but did not respond in any obvious military way, other than with the usual diplomatic rhetoric and an occasional incursion of its fighter jets into South Ossetia. Were they being careless or did they already know about the upcoming Georgian invasion of Tskhinvali and were making preparations of their own? Some suggest that Russia’s lightning-fast response and the number of forces involved is a sign that its military was ready and waiting. It’s a possibility: lack of any visible reaction from the Russians to the mortar and artillery attacks by the Georgians might have convinced Tbilisi and Washington that it was safe to act. On the other hand, Russia already had huge military presence at its bases in Vladikavkaz. These are some of Russia’s best troops used regularly in Chechnya.

A few days ago we all had a chance to witness Saakashvili’s impressive self-preservation instincts during his PR trip to Gori. His belligerent public speeches aside, Saakashvili is not a man who would risk his political career and his life to go to war, if he was not reasonably assured of victory. My impression is – and this is strictly my personal opinion – that Saakashvili did not jump the gun but launched the invasion of South Ossetia with the express permission from Washington. I also suspect that the Russians knew about the attack in advance. They may not have known the exact timing or the details, but they made sure Russian tanks were fueled and the soldiers had their milk and Wheaties in the morning.

Georgians chose to attack as the Olympic Games opened in China. If I was a Russian commander expecting a Georgian attack in the next few days or weeks, Friday, August 8, would have been marked on my calendar with a big red star. Did any of you wonder why Putin and not Medvedev went to the opening ceremony in Beijing? The Chinese press wrote on August 3 that Putin will be in China to “personally inspire Russian athletes to win gold medals”, as well as to promote the Sochi-2014 Winter Olympics. Perhaps Putin was in Beijing to inspire and promote, or maybe he had good reasons to think that Georgia would invade South Ossetia at the time of the opening ceremony and did not believe Medvedev would be able to handle Bush, Sarkozy, and Co.

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Major Weapons Acquisitions by Georgia
(Source: Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, August 2008)

Type	Manufacturer	Role	Quantity	Origin	First Delivery
122 mm D-30	n/a	Howitzer	30	Czech Republic	2006
152 mm Dana	Tatra	Self-Propelled Howitzer	12	Czech Republic	2006
Mi-24B/P ‘Hind’	Mil	Attack Helicopter	6	Ukraine	2005
Mi-8MT ‘Hip’	Mil	Helicopter	2	Ukraine	2005
T-72	n/a	Main Battle Tank	16	Ukraine	2005
T-72	n/a	Main Battle Tank	15	Czech Republic	2005
120 mm	n/a	Mortar	25	Czech Republic/Bosnia	2005
BTR-80	n/a	Armoured Personnel Carrier	20	Ukraine	2005
152 mm 2S3M	State Arsenals	Self-Propelled Howitzer	12	Ukraine	2004
BMP-2	Kurgan	Armoured Personnel Carrier	40	Ukraine	2004
Mi-35 ‘Hind’	Mil	Attack Helicopter	1	Uzbekistan	2004
120 mm	n/a	Mortar	14	Bulgaria	2004
Combattante II Class	Cherbourg	Fast Attack Craft – Missile	1	Greece	2004
Tavor	Israel Military Industries	Assault Rifle	n/a	Israel	2004
Mi-24 ‘Hind’	Mil	Attack Helicopter	3	Ukraine	2004
Mi-4 ‘Haze’	Mil	Naval Helicopter	2	Ukraine	2004
122 mm RM-70	ZTS Dubnica	Multiple Rocket System	6	Czech Republic	2003
152 mm Dana	Tatra	Self-Propelled Howitzer	2	Czech Republic	2003
SEM 70	Alcatel SEL AG	Radio Transmitters/Receivers	188	Latvia	2003
n/a	n/a	Small Arms and Ammunition	n/a	Bulgaria	2002
9 mm; 7.62 × 39 mm; 7.62 × 54 mm	n/a	Ammunition	1 million rounds	Czech Republic	2002
Mi-8	Mil	Helicopter	1	US	2002
An-28	Antonov	Transport Aircraft	1	US	2002
Vydra Class	Burgas Shipyard	Landing Craft	2	Bulgaria	2001
UH-1H	Bell	Helicopter	2	Turkey	2001
Point Class	USCG Yard, Curtis Bay	Patrol Craft	2	US	2000
UH-1H	Bell	Helicopter	10	US	2000
T-55AM2	Czech Arsenals	Main Battle Tank	10	Czech Republic	2000
MiG-21UM	Mikoyan	Fighter Trainer	2	n/a	2000
n/a	n/a	Personal Equipment	n/a	US	2000

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